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The modeling of fees within certain audit markets (notably, the United States and Australia) 
has assisted in understanding the factors that can explain the variability of audit fees. One 
important injluence on fees is said to be the premiums charged by so-called “higher quality” 
or “first tier” (Big Eight or, more recently, Big Six) auditors. The present study examines this 
issue in one important, but much under-researched, market, that of the United Kingdom. Spe- 
cifically, this study examines fee premiums paid (if any) by auditees which are not among the 
U.K. ‘s biggest companies but are firms that may be labeled as “medium-size. ” Using a 
matched-pair sampling technique to overcome a potentially serious methodological problem 
relating to the underrepresentation of non-Big Eight audited companies, this study found no 
price premium for Big Eight auditors compared to other suppliers in this sector. This suggests 
an absence of fee premiums for such auditors. Consistent with much previous research, other 
influences on audit fees (including auditees’ size, complexity, and risk) were all found to be 
significant, with auditor location being a less significant factor. 
INTRODUCTION 
An understanding of the pricing of audit services is of interest and impor- 
tance to suppliers and users of those services as well as to market regulators. 
There is evidence that some regulators view the audit services market as a homo- 
geneous commodity and the presence of systematic price differences is interpreted 
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by some as the existence of an uncompetitive market. A United States Senate Sub- 
Committee concluded that there was enough evidence to allege a serious lack of 
competition in the audit service market based on data on concentration statistics 
(U.S. Senate 1977). However, a market structure which has a limited (or concen- 
trated) set of suppliers does not necessarily imply the existence of monopolistic 
pricing (Francis 1984). In addition, numerous studies (mostly in the United States 
and Australia) have shown that the audit services market (even where dominated 
by the Big Eight or Big Six sets of firms) is efficient and competitive (see, e.g., 
Simunic 1980; Francis 1984). Perhaps the most recent evidence in respect of the 
presence of the level of competition for audit services comes from Australia, 
where the Trade Practices Commission (1992, 89) concluded that “there is active 
competition between audit firms despite the fact that there has been concentration 
in recent years in the number of accounting firms.” 
Systematic differences in audit prices charged by “Big” auditors (Big Six or 
Big Eight audit firms)] may, in fact, be evidence of higher quality rather than of a 
price monopoly by those firms. The empirical tests of this product differentiation 
(higher quality) hypothesis have been “suggestive but inconclusive” (Simunic and 
Stein 1987) although the recent study of Craswell, Francis, and Taylor (1993) 
based on auditor concentration (and not on the Big Eight/non-Big Eight dichot- 
omy) found fee premiums for auditors in industry specializations. The mixed 
nature of the results of previous research provides one motivation for the current 
research. A further motivation for the present study relates to the fact that there is 
little evidence on this question in respect of one large and important audit market, 
that of the United Kingdom. As indicated below, the vast majority of the empirical 
findings relate to the audit markets in the United States and Australia. In addition, 
a further motivation relates to a methodological issue raised from previous 
research. It can be argued that the dominance of the “Big” firm auditees in the 
samples used in previous research has potential for masking the presence of an 
audit fee price premium, as measured by a dummy variable. within linear regres- 
sion models. The substance of the methodological issue is discussed below. 
The next section of the article provides a theoretical rationale of audit firm 
quality (and price) differentiation. This is followed by a review of the relevant lit- 
erature in audit fee modeling. The sections that follow discuss: (1) the focus of the 
present study, (2) the variables used in this study, and (3) the research design and 
sample selection. The final two sections present the empirical findings and analy- 
sis of the results and provide a summary and conclusion of the study. 
UNDERPINNING THEORIES OF AUDIT FIRM QUALITY 
Several alternative theories have been proposed to explain the existence of 
product differentiation (i.e., audit quality differential commanding an audit fee 
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premium) in the audit services market. According to DeAngelo (1981), auditor 
size alone can explain the supply of a higher level of audit quality (defined as the 
joint probability of detecting and reporting material financial errors). 
Central to her argument is the notion of “client-specific quasi-economic 
rents” which exist because of auditor startup and client switching costs that serve 
as a “collateral” or a “bond” on independence and audit quality. Large audit firms 
stand to lose more client-specific quasi-economic rents simply because they have 
more clients. To avoid this loss, large firms have to produce higher quality audits 
to maintain their reputation. 
While the preceding argument views audit quality as a passive by-product of 
client-specific quasi-rents, there is an alternative view which suggests that audit 
firms are explicitly motivated to develop and maintain brand name reputations for 
quality in order to secure and protect quasi-rents arising from the investment in 
brand names (reputations) (Francis and Wilson 1988). This argument is based on 
the brand name investment model of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and 
Klein and Leffler (1981). According to this theory, the brand name development 
comes first and this, in turn, leads to a quality-assuring price that is higher than the 
minimum quality price. Here, the brand name is the “collateral” to provide incen- 
tive for producing quality audit and the loss of brand name means the loss of the 
present value of future quasi-rents (Francis and Wilson 1988). 
Simunic and Stein (1987) argued that the audit services market should be 
viewed from a demand-based model of product differentiation. According to 
them, audit service possesses two characteristics that are valued by companies’ 
top management. The first characteristic is the contribution of audit services to the 
organization control and the second is the credibility of audit services with exter- 
nal financial statement users. The former refers to the demand which arises from 
the internal agency conflicts of an organization, while the latter refers to the 
demand which arises from the external agency relationship. The second character- 
istic is simply associated with an auditor’s reputation as a quality audit supplier 
(i.e., brand name) (Simunic and Stein 1987). The demand for credible audit ser- 
vices is assumed to arise in the event of moral hazard as a result of the relationship 
with the external agency. 
The demand-based and brand name investment models are similar in the 
sense that both models use the brand name auditors as quality audit suppliers. 
Simunic and Stein (1987) argue that the demand-based model has an important 
advantage over the client-specific model of DeAngelo (198 1). The demand-based 
model is more flexible and it allows alternative ranking to firms (i.e., it is not 
merely tied with auditor’s size) in different circumstances. Furthermore, Simunic 
and Stein (1987) argued that DeAngelo’s assumptions lack empirical evidence. 
For example, there is a lack of evidence of a significant learning curve over time 
in auditing. In addition, evidence from psychology research suggests that sunk 
costs do affect subsequent decision making (Arkes and Blumer 1985). Francis and 
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Wilson (1988) developed models to test both contending theories of audit firm 
quality differences. Their results support the brand name model in which the Big 
Eight audit firms are defined as higher quality suppliers. 
It follows from the above that there should be a systematic relationship 
between audit quality and audit prices. All other things being equal, audit fees 
charged by the “first tier”-Big Eight or Big Six-auditors (i.e., the quality differ- 
entiated suppliers) should be significantly higher than those charged by other 
audit suppliers to reflect the better quality services provided by them. However, it 
should be noted that quality product differentiation may be confounded by the 
presence of economies of scale for Big Eight auditors, which can exist in either a 
monopolistic or a competitive market structure (Simunic 1980). Similarly, it can 
be argued that product differentiation may also be confounded by the presence of 
non-Big Eight diseconomies of scale in the audit of large clients. Additionally, it 
can be argued that for different sectors of the market-in particular, the medium 
and smaller auditee section-differing forces and levels of competition exist 
which also influence the existence and extent of “quality” premiums. 
EMPIRICAL AUDIT FEE LITERATURE 
In the United Kingdom, there are five major studies of audit fee determina- 
tion: Taylor and Baker (1981); Taffler and Ramalinggam (1982); Ramzy (1988); 
Chan, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam (1993); and Pong and Whittington (1994). There is 
a relatively extensive literature on the determinants of audit fees in the United 
States and Australia, including Gilling and Stanton (1978); Elliot and Korpi 
(1978); Simunic (1980); Pound and Francis (1981); Francis (1984); Simon (1985); 
Francis and Stokes (1986); Palmrose (1986); Francis and Simon (1987); Simon 
and Francis (1988); Jubb, Houghton, and Butterworth (forthcoming); Craswell, 
Francis, and Taylor (1993); and Butterworth and Houghton (1995), among others. 
Other research has looked at the market for audit services in other countries, 
including Low, Tan, and Kah (1990) and Lam and Chang (1993) in Singapore; 
Firth (1985) in New Zealand; and Simon, Ramanan, and Dugar (1986) in India. 
Most of these studies utilized multiple regression techniques to identify audit fee 
determinants and have examined auditees that are large listed companies. 
Summary of Findings of Audit Fee Modeling Research 
Generally, auditee size was found to be the most significant variable in 
explaining audit fees in most preceding studies including: Simunic (1980); Taylor 
and Baker (198 l), Francis (1984); Simon (1985); Simon and Francis (1988); Jubb 
et al. (forthcoming), and Butterworth and Houghton (1995). The majority of these 
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studies used total assets as a proxy for auditee size. Taffler and Ramalinggam 
(1982) used sales, while Elliot and Korpi (1978) Firth (1985), and Chan et al. 
(1993) used both sales and total assets. 
Measures of the auditees’ organizational complexity were found to be signif- 
icant in explaining audit fees in most studies. For example, Taylor and Baker 
(1981), Francis (1984), Francis and Stokes (1986), Pahnrose (1986), Francis and 
Simon (1987), Simon and Francis (1988), Butterworth and Houghton (1995), and 
Jubb et al. (forthcoming) found the number of subsidiaries to be highly signifi- 
cant. A similar (but arguably weaker) measure, the ratio of auditee’s receivables 
and/or inventories to the auditee’s total assets, was also found to be significant in 
several studies, including Simunic (1980), Simon (1985), Firth (1985), Francis 
and Stokes (1986), and Simon and Francis (1988). In addition, Simunic (1980) 
and Chan et al. (1993) reported that audit fee diversification significantly 
explained audit fees. 
Evidence regarding the significance of auditee risk is less conclusive. Francis 
(1984) did not find certain measures of risk (i.e., equity/debt ratio, operating 
losses and audit opinion) to be significant. However, equity/debt ratio and audit 
opinion were later found to be significant in Francis and Stokes (1986). Audit 
opinion was also significant in several other studies, including Simunic (1980), 
Pahnrose (1986), Francis and Simon (1987), Simon and Francis (1988), and But- 
terworth and Houghton (1995), among others. Another measure of risk-unsys- 
tematic risk-was significant in Firth (1985). 
Other Variables Influencing Audit Fees 
Other explanatory variables which have been shown to affect the level of 
audit fees are “busy season” and audit location. It could be expected that during an 
auditor’s “busy season,” the work loads for audit firms increase and, as a function 
of either demand or cost factors, higher prices might be charged for “busy season” 
clients. Rubin (1988) found this variable to be significant in a sample of the public 
sector market but Francis (1984) and Chan et al. (1993) found it not to be so in the 
private sector. Similarly, the audit location (particularly in some markets) might 
influence the level of variation in audit fee. Pahnrose (1986) measured the number 
of different auditee’s locations requiring on-site visits by the auditors* while Chan 
et al. (1993) used a dichotomous variable representing audit location (showing an 
audit fee premium for London office audits as opposed to those based in non-lon- 
don locations). Both studies observed a significant association between audit loca- 
tion and audit fees. 
Clearly, many other factors may influence the fee paid, not least of which is 
the state of the economy and the capacity of an auditee to purchase premium qual- 
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ity audit services. These variables and many others have not been examined in the 
existing literature. 
Audit Fees: Empirical Results as to the Existence of Fee Premiums 
Simunic’s (1980) results did not support the existence of premium pricing for 
Big Eight auditors but suggested that the Big Eight, as a group, tended to charge 
lower fees than the non-Big Eight firms. This is consistent with the presence of cost 
savings in the form of economies of scale in large audit firms. However, one audit 
firm, Price Waterhouse, received fees that were higher than expected, controlling 
for the size and complexity of auditees. Simunic attributed this to product differen- 
tiation (i.e., higher quality audit services) for that firm. Other studies replicated and 
tested Simunic’s model with mixed results. Simon (1985), Firth (1985) Chung and 
Lindsay (1988), and Chan et al. (1993) found auditor size not to be significant. Oth- 
ers, such as Francis (1984), Palmrose (1986) Simon and Francis (1988), Francis 
and Stokes (1986), Simon et al. (1986), Ettredge and Greenberg (1990), and But- 
terworth and Houghton (1995) found a significant association between auditor size 
and audit fees based on a Big Eight/non-Big Eight dichotomy. Palmrose (1986), 
Francis and Stokes (1986), and Francis and Simon (1987) reported that Big Eight 
prices were higher than non-Big Eight prices for small auditees, although no price 
differences were observed for large auditees, suggesting that there is product dif- 
ferentiation in smaller auditees’ market and diseconomies of scale when non-Big 
Eight firms audit large auditees. Francis (1984) and Chan et al. 1993), on the other 
hand, observed that Big Eight firms have significantly higher audit prices than non- 
Big Eight in samples of both large and small auditees. It should be noted that the 
companies in Francis’ (1984) sample were significantly smaller than those in other 
samples (e.g., Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986). Hence, it has been argued that it is 
difficult to generalize the existence of Big Eight (or Big Six) audit premiums (Simu- 
nit and Stein 1987) because research has been on differing sectors of the market. 
Thus, while the underpinning theory discussed above suggests the existence 
of quality fee premiums for the Big Eight auditors, the empirical evidence on this 
issue is, at best, mixed or, at worse, confused. The following discussion offers one 
possible explanation for these conflicting results. 
Methodological Flaw: Need for Matched-Pair Sample 
Simunic and Stein (1987) attributed this conflicting evidence to the method- 
ological problems that are present in most studies. In particular, they noted (p. 4): 
Many audit fee determinants are correlated with company size, the relation between fees and 
size is non-linear, and, because of the dominance of the Big Eight firms in the audit of large 
Audit Fee Premiums of Big Eight Firms 59 
companies, it is difficult to obtain a sample of audits in which the clients of Big Eight firms 
are well matched in size. A failure to properly control for non-linear client size effects on fees 
can easily lead to biased coefficient for the auditor identity variable. 
Dopuch (1984) observed the same methodological problem when discussing 
Palmrose’s (1984) paper on auditor choice that utilized logit regression. He sug- 
gested further studies adopt a matched-pair sampling technique to solve the prob- 
lem. Simunic and Stein (1987) made a similar suggestion. 
Pong and Whittington (1994) also argue that the conventional approach to 
audit fee modeling is methodologically flawed, although they do not specifically 
recommend the use of matched pair sampling to overcome the problems. As Table 
1 shows, most of the studies use unbalanced samples (Big Eight versus non-Big 
Eight auditees) and no study listed uses a matched-pair sampling method. For 
example, the Big Eight auditees for the sample size in Simunic (1980) are four 
times as large as non-Big Eight auditees in the large auditee sample and one-and- 
a-half times as large those in the small auditee sample. Given the concerns of 
Simunic and Stein (1987), the structure of these samples may, potentially, have 
given rise to unreliable and unstable results. As noted below, the present study 
examines audit fee premiums paid by auditees that might be referred to as 
“medium size.” This is useful for two reasons. First, it allows for more appropriate 
matching on Big Eight and non-Big Eight auditees to occur. Second, it provides 
the opportunity to examine a section of the market for audit services which is 
much underresearched as compared with the market for large auditees. 
Focus OF PRESENT STUDY 
The foregoing provides a theoretical rationale for the presence of audit qual- 
ity and describes the existing empirical evidence. Consistent with the theory, it is 
hypothesized that Big Eight auditors will be the suppliers of higher quality audits 
as compared with the non-Big Eight firms, and will receive fee premiums in 
return for the additional quality. Specifically, the proposition is tested with the fol- 
lowing (null form) hypothesis: 
H,,: In a given year, the audit fees paid by medium-size U.K. auditees to Big Eight 
audit firms are not significantly higher than to non-Big Eight firms, all other 
things being equal. 
If this hypothesis is rejected, there is evidence consistent with a price or fee 
premium in the audit services market for Big Eight auditors. Given the theory noted 
above, this would support the perception that the Big Eight audit firms are quality- 
differentiated auditors for this important section of the market, the so-called 
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premium does not exist and that in the section of the market under investigation 
there is no discernible “quality” differentiation between Big Eight and Non Big 
Eight auditors. Importantly, this study will not just contribute to our understanding 
of the market for “medium size” auditees; it will also add to a remarkably small 
number of studies that have examined one of the largest and arguably most impor- 
tant markets for audit services in the world, that of the United Kingdom. 
In order to test for price premium, other factors which might affect audit fees 
will be controlled. The next section identifies these control variables as well as the 
dependent variable in the study and the measures used for each variable. 
DESCRPTION OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Auditee Size 
It is expected that as client size increases, so too will the audit fee, although 
not in a linear fashion. There are at least four aspects to this relationship. First, as 
the size of the auditee increases, all other things being equal, the audit work which 
has to be carried out will also increase. Second, as with other commodities, it is 
easier for the auditor to achieve economies of scale in its production function as 
output increases. Third, economies of scale will also occur from the use of audit 
sampling techniques, because as the auditee size becomes larger, the audit sample 
for compliance and substantive testings will increase at a decreasing rate (Butter- 
worth and Houghton 1995). Finally, it can be argued that larger companies are 
likely to have more sophisticated internal control systems. Therefore the larger the 
auditee, the more likely economics can be achieved in the audit process. In the 
present study, total assets are used to measure auditee size. 
Auditee Complexity 
As with auditee size, auditee complexity is also hypothesized to be positively 
related to the audit fees. A complex firm which has a complex legal and/or organi- 
zational structure requires additional audit time and hence greater audit fees. From 
the contracting theory point of view, as a firm’s complexity increases, so does the 
possibility of moral hazard. All other things being equal, there is a greater chance 
for unscrupulous managers to transfer wealth without being detected, hence the 
need for audit quantity and quality. 
In this study, the number of consolidated subsidiaries plus one (i.e., subsid- 
iary company plus its holding company) is used as a measure of auditee complex- 
ity. This continuous measure of complexity represents the auditee’s legal/ 
organizational dispersion. As with size, this relationship is not linear and as com- 
plexity increases audit fees, most likely, will rise at a decreasing rate. 
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Auditee Risk 
Risk is an important factor in audit fee explanation for two reasons. It is 
expected that as the auditee risk increases, the audit fee will also rise as a result of 
either more audit work or “insurance” premium considerations. There are several 
possible measures of risk (see Jubb et al. forthcoming). One overall measure of 
auditee risk comes from the capital market-systematic risk or beta. The present 
study uses systematic risk (B), which represents the volatility of stocks’ return to 
the market. Chan et al. (1993,769) argue that such a market-based measure of risk 
is a good proxy for client or auditee risk. 
Other Independent Variables 
As noted from the analysis of the previous literature, two further variables 
that might be expected to affect audit fees are included in the model. The first is 
the timing of audit work and the other is the auditor location. It is hypothesized 
that audits performed during the “busy season” (in the United Kingdom, this is 
defined as being between December 1 and March 31) are more costly because of 
greater demand for auditors during that time (Rubin 1988; Chan et al. 1993). A 
dummy variable is used to classify the season based on accounting year end which 
is disclosed in the annual reports. Similarly, audit location is thought to influence 
audit costs due to different efforts that are necessary for coordination of the 
engagement (Palmrose 1986). Moreover, audit staff costs in certain “premium” 
locations are thought to be higher than those in lower cost (provincial) cities. As 
with Chan et al. (1993), a dummy variable is used to represent different auditor 
locations. It is hypothesized that South-Eastern based (i.e., London-based) U.K. 
auditors charge higher fees than in other U.K. locations. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the model is the monetary value of audit fees in 
1989. In the United Kingdom, unlike the United States, data on audit fees are pub- 
licly available because of a legal requirement which includes substantial penalties 
for nondisclosure as well as for inaccurate disclosure. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In the context of the U.K. market, the present study extends the earlier stud- 
ies of audit fee determinants using a sample of matched-pair companies, in terms 
of auditee size and industry classification, that are audited by Big Eight and the 
non-Big Eight frims. 
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The basis for the sample in this study is the list of 500 U.K. companies 
ranked from 501 to 1000 in the Times 1000 (1990) edition. The selection of the 
group of companies, which were not among the United Kingdom’s largest, has 
three important advantages. First, it lowers the possibility of the presence of disec- 
onomies of scale for non-Big Eight auditors for large audits. Second, it increases 
the number of instances of non-Big Eight auditees from within the sample. Third, 
it provides evidence from a sector of the market not as widely or extensively 
researched. Each of these companies was examined to determine its auditors 
based on the information in the International Stock Exchange Yearbook (1990). 
Those companies that were either not listed in the Stock Exchange Yearbook or 
did not have information regarding their auditors, were eliminated from the sam- 
ple. Companies that were audited by more than one audit firm were also excluded 
as it was not possible to divide the level of fees paid to each of the listed auditors. 
As a result, 215 companies remained, with 55 companies (i.e., 25%) audited by 
the non-Big Eight firms and the remainder relating to the Big Eight auditors. Each 
non-Big Eight auditee was matched with a Big Eight auditee in the same industry 
with a similar size company as measured by sales(* U.K.&20 million), in the same 
industry (as defined by the London Stock Exchange classification), and having a 
Big Eight auditor. In all, 52 matched-pair companies were included in the data set 
at this point, three having been excluded due to the lack of a suitable matched pair. 
Information on systematic risk was obtained from the London Business 
School Risk Measurement Service (1990). Several more companies that did not 
have the necessary data were deleted from the dataset, leaving 42 pairs of compa- 
nies. One pair of companies was deleted for statistical reasons due to their undue 
(and therefore unrepresentative) influence on the regression equation. Table 2 
summarizes the construction of the data set. 
A regression of the log of audit fees on the explanatory variables is utilized 
to provide the evidence on price premium. Specifically, the model is defined as 
the equation below: 
AFee, = b, + b, Audi + b2 Sizei + b3 Complexi+ bbiiski + b5 Seasoni + be Locutioni+ p 








Audit fee charged to auditee i (loglo transformed) 
size of auditee i’s auditor (Big Eight or Non Big Eight) 
size of auditee i (total assets, log l0 transformed) 
complexity of auditee i (number of subsidiaries + 1) 
risk of auditee i (beta) 
busy period for auditors or not (coded O/l) 
location of auditor (South East, U.K.) or not (coded O/l) 
error term (assumed to be normally distributed) 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Selection Procedure 
Total companies ranked from 50 1 to 1000 in The Times 1000 
(1990 edition) 
Less companies not listed or without information about auditors in 
the International Stock Exchange Yearbook (1990) edition 
A. Total Preliminary Sample 
Companies audited by Non-Big Eight firms from preliminary sample 
Less Non-Big Eight auditees which did not have suitable pairs 
Less companies eliminated due to missing data 
Sample of Non-Big Eight auditees 
Add matched pairs from Big Eight auditees 
B. Final Sample Used for Preliminary Analysis 
Less company pair deleted due to undue influence on regression estimate 
C. Final Sample Upon Which Analysis is Based 














RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
Preliminary Analysis 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the model. 
The audit fees for the sample population range from (U.K.) 528,000 to &501,000, 
while sales range from &60 million to 5314 million. Inspection of these variables 
reveals that some of them-in particular, those that proxy for auditee size and 
complexity-were not normally distributed and, thus, required transformation for 
the evidence that followed.3 
Table 4 presents a matrix of simple correlation coefficients for the trans- 
formed variables in the model. The first row contains the correlation of the depen- 
dent variable (i.e., audit fees) with each of the independent variables. Several 
variables that proxy for size, complexity, and audit location are significantly cor- 
related with audit fees. There are two significant correlations among independent 
variables as expected. Total assets &(logio transformed) was found to be signifi- 
cantly correlated with number of consolidated subsidiaries (also loglo trans- 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Control Variables 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
Audit Fees (U.K.f) 
Size 









153452.38 98928.89 2.21 1.40 34000 501000 
115403 102178 12.51 3.08 29,684 68 1,000 
119532 36226 8.83 2.12 59336 3 14,000 
18.37 15.27 18.83 3.25 1 106 
0.93 0.23 0.18 -0.47 0.25 1.43 
0.63 0.49 -1.74 -0.55 0 1 
0.60 0.49 -1.89 -0.40 0 1 
Notes: ‘Number of consolidated subsidiaries plus one (holding company). 
*Beta is systematic or market risk-subsequently designated as “risk.” 
3Categorical measure for “busy season,” coded 1 if accounting year-end lies within December- 
March; 0 otherwise. 
‘Dichotomous variable for auditor’s location, coded 1 if an audit carried out by a London office; 
1 otherwise. 
formed) at r = 0.2321. Unexpectedly, the correlation between sales (loglo 
transformed) and total assets is not significant (r = 0.1968), which is contrary to 
expectations (one would expect two measures of size to be highly correlated) and 
previous findings (see Firth 1985; Chan et al. 1993). 
One plausible explanation for this result is different intensity in labor and 
capital utilization. For example, companies in the engineering industry are more 
capital intensive than companies in the leisure industry. Furthermore, it could be 
due to the economic recession in the period of study which caused variable earn- 
ings in some companies. In general, these correlations are not expected to create a 
significant problem in interpreting the regression results. The impact of these cor- 
relations on the regressions results will be further noted in the analysis that fol- 
lows. Note that no significant correlations were detected between the hypothesis 
variable (Big Eight/non-Big Eight) and the control variables. 
Univariate Analysis 
A comparison of group means (Big Eight/non-Big Eight) for each dependent 
and independent variable is provided in Table 5. The mean sales is about 
U.K.&199 million, which is substantially smaller than another U.K.-based study 
(Chan et al. 1993). A univariate test (t-test) indicates no significant difference 
between the independent variables (size, complexity, etc.) for the two subsamples 
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TABLE 5 
Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) 















Non-Big Eight Auditees T-test 
5.0664 (0.273) -1.30 
7.9067 (0.284) -1.66 
3.6736 (1.508) -1.22 
0.9252 (0.233) -0.18 
0.6190 (0.492) -0.22 
0.6190 (0.492) 0.44 
Note: *Loglo transformed. 
auditor identity variable are not likely to be confounded by systematic differences 
in the other variables in the model. 
Multivariate Analysis 
In order to test for audit fee determinants, several regressions were estimated 
where audit fees were regressed on a set of independent variables.4 Table 6 
reveals the final result.5 The signs of all regression coefficients are as expected. A 
good linear fit was achieved with adjusted R2 of 0.5 137~.~ Regression assumptions 
of normally distributed residuals and constant variance were not violated. 
However, the auditor identity variable (Big Eight/non-Big Eight) was not 
significant, as hypothesized. This result is consistent with that of Simunic (1980). 
It does not support the existence of premium pricing for the Big Eight auditors and 
is consistent with the presence of competition in this segment of the market (i.e., 
the “medium-size” sector of the U.K. market).7 Using Simunic’s framework, it 
TABLE 6 
Results of Ordinary Least Square Regression of Big Eight/Non-Big Eight, Size, 
Complexity, Risk, Busy Season, and Location on Audit Fees 

















+ 0.0105 0.0419 0.251 0.8028 
+ 0.277 1 0.0783 3.536 0.0070 
+ 0.0955 0.0141 6.787 0.0000 
+ 0.1844 0.0920 2.003 0.0487 
+ 0.0133 0.0436 0.306 0.7607 
+ 0.0787 0.0432 1.822 0.0724 
+ 2.2980 0.6234 3.686 0.0004 
Model statistics: Adjusted R2 = 5 1.35%; F-ratio = 15.60003; Significant F = 0.000 
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may also imply that there are no diseconomies of scale when non-Big Eight firms 
audit medium-size auditees and that audit services may be viewed as homoge- 
neous goods, at least in this segment of the U.K. market. 
Consistent with a priori reasoning, all measures of size, complexity, and risks 
were found to be significant. In particular, the proxy risk (beta), which had not 
been found statistically significant in previous studies of audit fees, was signifi- 
cantly associated with audit fees. This confirms the theory presented by Jubb et al. 
(forthcoming) that auditee risk is reflected in the fee charged by the auditor. The 
result for variable “busy season” is insignificant. This is consistent with the grow- 
ing phenomenon of year-round audits and partial audits being undertaken in non- 
busy seasons. Such work patterns reduce or eliminate the premium of work signed 
off during the “busy” season. 
The audit location variable was (weakly) significant. This result is consistent 
with the presence of higher costs for auditors within the London area (as opposed 
to other parts of the United Kingdom), or reflects that London auditors provide a 
higher quality audit than auditors in other locations, which confirms the earlier 
result that audit location is an explanatory variable within the U.K. market. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has examined the presence or absence of price premiums for Big 
Eight auditors in the U.K. market for audit services. The study was motivated from 
two perspectives: (1) the limited evidence concerning the U.K. market for audit ser- 
vices; and (2) the largely inconclusive evidence concerning audit quality premiums. 
In respect of the second motivation, it is observed that many previous studies 
have been based on auditee samples where there is significant underrepresentation 
of non-Big Eight (or non-Big Six) auditees. It is argued that this potentially 
important methodological flaw may give rise to unreliable results. Using a 
matched-pair sample of Big Eight and non-Big Eight auditees within the medium- 
size sector of the U.K. market for auditee services, the present study tested for the 
presence of the audit premium paid to Big Eight auditors. 
In addition to examining whether the auditor class variable explains audit 
fees, the present study controlled for the variability of audit fees explainable by 
auditee size (total assets), complexity, and risk and whether the audit is under- 
taken within the busy season and within certain geographic sectors of the market. 
These control variables were all hypothesized to be positive. The empirical results 
show that as auditee size, complexity, and risk increased, so did the auditee’s 
audit fee. Further, audits undertaken within the South East (i.e., London) region of 
the United Kingdom were (weakly) significantly higher than audits undertaken 
elsewhere in the United Kingdom. No fee premium appeared to be paid for audits 
completed in the so-called busy season. 
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The hypothesized variable, Big Eight/non-Big Eight auditor, was not signifi- 
cant and it can be concluded that no price premium is paid within this sector of the 
market for Big Eight auditors. This conclusion is, however, limited to a sector of 
the market that does not include the largest of listed U.K. companies. 
The conclusions reached in the present study are limited in several ways. 
First, a matched-pair sampling technique was used and the validity of the conclu- 
sions relies, in part, on the quality of the matching process. As indicated above, 
great care was taken in this process so as to minimize any threat to validity. Sec- 
ond, since the study relates to “medium-size” auditees, the validity of the conclu- 
sions may not hold for other sections of the audit market, in particular for the large 
auditee section of the market where non-Big Eight auditors may not compete. 
Third, the model specified is not complete. The adjusted R2 showed that only 
about half the variability in audit fees was explained by the model. Other factors 
or variables, omitted in this study, may explain other aspects of the variability in 
audit fees. If these variables interact with the Big Eight/non-Big Eight effect, the 
conclusions drawn from the results in this study may need to be reconsidered. 
Finally, the effect of the hypothesis variable may not be the same in some other 
audit markets. In the United Kingdom, the distinction between the Big Eight, (now 
Big Six) and other auditors is comparatively clearcut, as it is in several other coun- 
tries such as the United States and Australia. This distinction is less clear in many 
European nations as well as in some countries in Asia, where large local or national 
(as opposed to international) firms are major suppliers of audit services. 
These limitations provide several opportunities for further research. In par- 
ticular, research comparing the differing effects that variables such as auditor 
class, auditee complexity, or risk may have on fees between different national 
audit markets, may provide valuable insights into the market for audit services in 
both developed and developing economies. 
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NOTES 
1. In the late 198Os, certain mergers occurred, reducing the then-Big Eight and audit firms to the 
Big Six. Many of the research studies noted here took place prior to this change. “Big Eight” 
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2. 
3. 
and “Big Six” are used as synonyms to describe the first tier of auditors, all of which are inter- 
national in operation, although the names sometimes vary from one nation to another. The Big 
Eight firms within the United Kingdom are: Price Waterhouse, Arthur Andersen, Arthur 
Young, Peat Marwick McLintock, Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Ernst and Whinney, Touche 
Ross, and Coopers and Lybrand. Arthur Young and Ernst and Whinney merged to become 
Ernst and Young, while Coopers and Lybrand merged with Deloitte and Sells to become Coo- 
pers Lybrand and Deloitte. These mergers occurred in the United Kingdom in 1989 and 1990, 
respectively. 
One might argue, however, that the number of different on-site locations required in the audit 
is a proxy for auditee complexity. 






Both measures of size (i.e., LGTOVER and LGTA) were tested independent of each other. 
LGTOVER was dropped from the model due to its lack of significance. As expected, it was 
not significant due to the matching procedure using a sample selection. The result for the 
hypothesis variable is identical, as are the results for other explanatory variables. 
A separate regression was also carried out with the outliers (one pair of companies). The 
results for all variables are similar except for systematic risk (BETA) and audit location 
(LOCAT) variables. BETA is not significant at all, while LOCAT is more significant (P = 
0.0724). In addition, a regression was tested with the untransformed audit fees as a dependent 
variable since the skewness and kurtosis are within conventional levels of acceptability. The 
sign of the hypothesis variable (LOCAT) improves to 0.0193 but the risk proxy (8) was insig- 
nificant. The results of other explanatory variables are similar to the ones reported in Table 6, 
Although the adjusted R’ increased to approximately 56%. 
The level of explained variants is in excess of SO%, which is somewhat less than other recent 
studies. This lower level of explanation can be explained by virtue of the matched-pair sam- 
pling, where the size variable will explain less of the variance than where nonmatched sam- 
ples are used. 
The tests of constructing and examining histograms of the residuals and normal probability 
plots of the observed and expected distribution of the residuals did not seriously depart from 
the assumption of normality. The Kolgomorov-Smirov one-way test could not reject the null 
hypothesis of normally distributed residuals at any level of significance. A Goldtield-Quandt 
test was used to check for any heteroscedasticity. The residuals for the overall regression are 
homoscedastic. 
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